“Thought Leaders” - Plutocracy’s Masters of Deception
The economists, doctors, and "legal experts" who are driven by ego and greed.
THE HIGHLY COMPENSATED “THOUGHT LEADERS”
Theoretically, a “Thought Leader” means one whose views on a subject are taken to be authoritative and influential. Thought leaders are the informed opinion leaders and the go-to people in their field of expertise. In reality, thought leaders are primarily academics who are highly compensated by an industry to either maintain the status quo of the industry or increase market share for their benefactors. It is important to remember that this requires more greed than thought on the part of these leaders.
The financial services industry, pharmaceutical companies, and, most recently, multidistrict litigation courts retain highly compensated thought leaders.
Financial Services Industry
Alan Greenspan steadfastly refused to regulate derivatives. Greenspan’s deregulation ideology significantly contributed to the 2008 meltdown of the financial services industry.
Since the 1980s, academic economists, e.g., Martin Feldstein (Professor of Economics, Harvard) and Glenn Hubbard (Dean, Columbia Business School), have been major advocates of Greenspan’s deregulation ideology and have played powerful roles in shaping U.S. government policy. Even after the 2008 meltdown, many prominent university professors of economics actively oppose reform by serving as thought leaders.
These “unbiased” university professors of economics made fortunes by helping the financial services industry shape public debate and government policy (consulting, speaking engagements, and serving as board directors).
Pharmaceutical Companies
How do doctors decide which drugs to use for their patients?
In response to this question, Dr. Marcia Angell points out, “Some of them, unfortunately, depend on drug company marketing. But most doctors depend, at least in part, on a number of supposedly unbiased sources of information. They read medical journals to find out about new research and how to interpret it; they use textbooks to see what conclusions the expert authors draw from the overall body of scientific evidence; and they go to meetings and continuing medical education courses to hear from these experts (called ‘thought leaders’) firsthand. These last two sources are, in fact, derivatives of the first. Textbooks and the thoughts of thought leaders are no better than the evidence on which they are based. And that evidence comes from research reports in medical journals. So it is crucial that those reports be unbiased. Are they? Increasingly, the answer is no. Most clinical research on drugs is sponsored by the companies that make them.”
Dr. Angell explains, “Drug companies pay particular attention to wooing so-called thought leaders. These are prominent experts, usually on medical school faculties and teaching hospital staffs, who write papers, contribute to textbooks, and give talks at medical meetings - all of which greatly affect the use of drugs in their fields. Thought leaders have influence far beyond their numbers. Pharmaceutical companies shower special favors on these doctors, offer them honoraria as consultants and speakers, and often pay for them to attend conferences in posh resorts, ostensibly to seek their advice.
In many drug-intensive medical specialties, it is virtually impossible to find an expert who is not receiving payments from one or more drug companies. In the case of thought leaders, flattery is key. They are told their expertise is invaluable in helping companies to develop new drugs. But in fact, thought leaders are usually clinicians, who study drugs after they are developed. What they really have to offer drug companies is the ability to sway large numbers of other doctors.”
Dr. Angell wrote an editorial, titled “Is Academic Medicine for Sale?” in which she expressed her concern about the merging of commercial and academic interests. In response to the editorial, a reader sent a letter to the editor asking rhetorically, “Is academic medicine for sale? No. The current owner is very happy with it.”
Dr. Angell points out, “In the summer of 2003, The New York Times obtained confidential documents from PhRMA that detailed its plans to buy influence in the coming fiscal year. According to the report, spending for that purpose would increase by 23 percent - to $150 million. Of that, $73 million would go for lobbying at the federal level and $49 million at the state level….Expenditures would include $5 million to lobby the FDA. (Aside from the propriety of an industry lobbying the agency that regulates it, we have to wonder what effect it has on the commissioner's speeches.) More than $12 million would subsidize ‘likeminded’ doctor, patient, academic, and influential racial minority organizations. Another $1 million would be spent on an ‘intellectual echo chamber of economists - a standing network of economists and thought leaders to speak against federal price control regulations through articles and testimony, and to serve as a rapid response team.’ There would be $500,000 for ‘placement of op-eds and articles by third parties.’ In addition, $18 million would go to fight price controls and protect patent rights in foreign countries. Perhaps the most arrogant allotment was $1 million ‘to change the Canadian health care system’ (do the Canadians know PhRMA thinks they can be bought so cheaply?), and another $500,000 to block the influx of drugs from Canada.”
Dr. Angell states, “In a 2003 editorial, The Washington Post summed up the situation very well. It warned, ‘Anyone arguing the drug companies’ case, no matter how neutral his or her academic or think tank position may seem, should be questioned carefully with regard to sources of income.’ Too often reporters don't do that. Two reporters for a major newspaper told me that one reason they don't ask is that asking makes it harder to write their stories. If they find out their sources have conflicts of interest, their editors may require them to search for new sources. Or the sources may become indignant at being questioned. So there is an implicit ‘don't ask, don't tell’ policy. But if reporters identify their sources only by their academic credentials, without adding information about relevant commercial ties, they are misleading their readers.”
Readers should remember the admonitions of Dr. Angell, “Doctors need to be weaned from their dependence on drug company largesse….Any doctor arguing the drug companies’ case, no matter how neutral his or her academic position may seem, should be questioned carefully with regard to sources of income….Nowadays, even the most distinguished and apparently unbiased academics may be on the pharmaceutical industry’s payroll. If they are, you need to be especially skeptical about their pronouncements.”
Multidistrict Litigation
In the BP oil well blowout MDL, Judge Barbier points out, “The parties have tendered either jointly or on their own behalf four experts in the law of class actions: Professors Coffee, Issacharoff, Klonoff, and Miller. The Court cites to, or in some instances quotes from, the opinions of these experts at various points in the analysis….of class certification issues.”
These “unbiased” opinions are included to deceive the class members. If the MDL 2179 economic and property damages settlement agreement is indeed fair, reasonable, adequate, and free of collusion, it would be clearly obvious to anyone who reads the agreement. There would be no need to retain “four experts in the law of class actions” to try to lend a thin veneer of respectability to an otherwise abhorrent, one-sided agreement.
The following are sixteen of the “unbiased” opinions of these highly-compensated expert legal “Thought Leaders” in MDL 2179. Judge Barbier included each of these false and misleading opinions in his Order granting final approval of the economic and property damages settlement agreement.
Opinion No. 1
“This Settlement is nearly the epitome of how a class in a mass tort action ought to be defined, as it is objective, precise, and detailed, and does not turn on the merits.”
Opinion No. 2
“Since their appointment, members of the PSC have diligently prosecuted this litigation, consulted widely among class members in negotiating the Settlement, and aggressively represented the interests of their clients.”
Opinion No. 3
“This case suffers from none of the problems identified in Amchem, where the Court noted a potential intraclass conflict, in the context of a settlement with an overall cap, between individuals who had already been injured by asbestos and those who had only been exposed to it. Rather, the proposed class in this case consists exclusively of individuals and businesses that have already suffered economic loss and property damage, and the Settlement compensates class members for their past losses through detailed, objective compensation criteria and for their anticipated potential future damages through RTP payments or through other methods that take into account risk of future loss.”
Opinion No. 4
According to Professor Miller, this case is “perhaps the single most impressive class action settlement I have observed in nearly thirty years as a scholar, practitioner, and teacher in the field” in its structural features designed to avoid intraclass conflicts.”
Opinion No. 5
“….the settlement terms for each identifiable subgroup were subjected to the approval of a seventeen-member Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee. The PSC was consulted and participated throughout the settlement process. Whenever a particular category of claims was discussed during negotiations, lawyers who had clients with such claims took an active role in advising the negotiators.”
Opinion No. 6
“….the claims frameworks offering generally uncapped compensation ensure that a benefit paid to one member of the class will in no way reduce or interfere with a benefit obtained by another member. This Settlement is not a zero-sum game. While the Seafood Compensation Program was funded at the specific level of $2.3 billion, the parties took numerous measures to avoid the risk of intraclass conflict, including (i) using a Court-appointed neutral, who heard directly from various Seafood claimants (e.g., shrimpers, crabbers, oystermen and finfishers) to determine the initial and subsequent allocations; and (ii) agreeing to a total amount of compensation that, based on available and reliable data, is more than sufficient to compensate all class members.”
Opinion No. 7
“….the benefits of the Settlement are directed towards those who were most impacted, while persons with marginal or potentially worthless claims, whose presence could have complicated the settlement process, were excluded from the proposed class, and thus remain free to pursue their claims.”
Opinion No. 8
“….there was no discussion of attorneys’ fees until all other terms of the agreement were negotiated, agreed upon, reduced to writing, and submitted to the Court, so Class Counsel could not have engaged in trading off the interests of class representatives or absent class members so as to maximize their fee recovery.”
Opinion No. 9
“Because a class action is the vastly superior method by which to resolve the impact of this mass disaster on the Gulf Coast Region, it would be a social tragedy if class certification were denied….Individual lawsuits are neither a feasible nor a sensible alternative to a class action in this case.”
Opinion No. 10
“….the Settlement preserved the Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out opportunity, and provided a generous opt-out period that the Court later extended to November 1, 2012. Any plaintiff who does not wish to take part in the Settlement remained free to opt-out of the settlement class and pursue his own action.”
Opinion No. 11
“The uncontroverted evidence establishes that the Settlement was reached only after many months of hard-fought negotiations that were conducted simultaneously with adversarial trial preparations.”
Opinion No. 12
“Plaintiffs were represented by a large number of experienced attorneys on the Court-appointed PSC, who came from diverse backgrounds and geographies and represented the various types of class members, who were involved in either the negotiation or approval of this Settlement.”
Opinion No. 13
“Class Counsel, class representatives, and the vast majority of absent class members all agree that the Settlement Agreement is a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of this litigation. This is perhaps best illustrated by the extraordinary number of putative objectors (non-class members) who wish to be included within the Settlement. ‘What the objections do illustrate - in vivid form - is the fact that this settlement is viewed as so desirable that people are clamoring to get in.’”
Opinion No. 14
“Certain objectors complain that the Economic Damage Claim Frameworks are unfair because they do not compensate persons who did not begin suffering losses until 2011. Yet this provision is reasonable for three reasons: (i) the Macondo well ceased flowing in July 2010; (ii) there is evidence that by late 2010, Gulf Coast tourism had returned to or surpassed 2009 levels; and (iii) as to claims by individuals and businesses in charter fishing, seafood processing, or other businesses relying on access to Gulf waters, nearly all federal and state waters were reopened for commercial fishing by November 2010. Thus, extending compensation to 2011 would cover losses not likely caused by the spill.” (Emphasis added)
Opinion No. 15
“The objective evidence shows that the causation tests available under the Settlement Agreement are both economically reasonable and highly favorable to claimants, which is why they were negotiated by experienced counsel in consultation with their clients and experts. Claimants unable to satisfy any of the causation standards would likely encounter litigation difficulties.”
Opinion No. 16
“Other objectors complain that before they can invoke the V-Shaped Revenue Pattern test, they must demonstrate a 5% revenue recovery during the correlating months of 2011 as compared to the 2010 baseline period. This provision is reasonable, as losses that continued after the spill are likely to be due to factors other than the spill.” (Emphasis added)
The Aggregate Fee Petition includes a declaration by Brian T. Fitzpatrick, a law professor at Vanderbilt University and an MDL 2179 “Thought Leader.” Professor Fitzpatrick states, “I have never seen a case this complex nor one that required more of class counsel. The number of moving parts here was - and this is an understatement - dizzying. The law, the facts, the science - all of it was far more challenging than perhaps any class action case I have ever seen.”
Given the opinions of Judge Barbier and Professor Fitzpatrick, the victims of the BP oil well blowout are led to believe that the PSC attorneys are zealously advocating on their behalf. Justice is most assuredly just around the corner.
Justice is defined by numbers, not by words. More to the point, it is defined by the amount of monetary compensation received by the plaintiffs, not by “the immense amount of work” allegedly performed by the dealmakers of the PSC.
Regrettably for the victims of the BP oil well blowout, the amount of monetary compensation received is miniscule. The “Thought Leaders” earned their money.
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